this influence is measured by the improvement in the Why do people take advice? To find out, we provided quality of the judgment. Here we shall be concerned a low, medium, or high level of training on a task in primarily with factors that determine the influence that which judgments varied in importance. Then, in a test advice has on a judge. a doctor who has assessed a terminally ill patient's life ices: people appear reluctant to reject completely the help offered to them. Second, all judges took more ad-expectancy and then asked a colleague for an indepenvice from advisors more experienced than themselves, dent opinion. According to Hogarth and Einhorn (1992), and the amount that they took was related to the differ-the doctor forms a final opinion by taking a weighted ence in level of experience: people appeared to be try-average of his or her prior opinion and the colleague's ing to use advice to improve their judgments. Third, advice. The weight given to the advice depends on the experience enabled people to distinguish judgments person's sensitivity to new information. This, in turn, on the basis of their importance. Experienced judges depends on situational variables such as the credibility took about twice as much advice for the most important of the source of the new information (e.g., the colleague's
is not sensitive to information about a favorite theory. Their model therefore implies that people receiving advice should take their beliefs about their own level of In many institutions, judges or executives take indi-expertise into account as well as their beliefs about the vidual decisions after conferring with one or more advi-expertise of their advisors. sors or consultants. With a few rare exceptions (e.g., At present, there appears to be no direct evidence Gardner & Berry, 1995; Sniezek & Buckley, 1993 , 1995 , that either of these factors is important in determining judge-advisor systems of this type have not been stud-the influence of advice on judgments themselves. Howied systematically by psychologists. To investigate ever, recent work on people's confidence in their judgthem, a person can be asked to make an initial judgment ments suggests that they take their perceptions of both on the basis of some evidence, provided with advice their own expertise (Arkes, Christensen, Lai, & Blumer, from some source, and then asked for a final judgment. 1987; Trafimow & Sniezek, 1994) and their advisors' Influence of the advice is measured by the size of the expertise (Sniezek & Buckley, 1995) into account. Arkes shift between the initial and final judgment. Effect of et al. (1987) and Trafimow and Sniezek (1994) found that experimental manipulations designed to reduce confidence in their recommendations influenced a There are a number of possibilities: we shall briefly outline two of them. judge's selections in a two-alternative question-answering task. Both confidence and performance tend to inFirst, novices may, rightly or wrongly, see themselves as capable of making reasonably good judgments. Howcrease with practice. Consequently, judges may regard confidence as signifying expertise and, therefore, be ever, they perceive good judgment to be so cognitively demanding that they normally decide to place heavy more likely to take advice from confident individuals. Results confirmed this: when the two advisors dis-reliance on their advisors' views. Only when judgments are particularly important do they decide to carry out agreed, judges tended to accept the recommendations from the more confident one.
the additional mental work needed to avoid this reliance (cf. Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994) . This suggests Research in two other areas also suggests that people will take both their own and their advisors' expertise that novices should place less reliance on advisors and be less influenced by advisors' levels of expertise when into account. First, Birnbaum, Wong, and Wong (1976) and Birnbaum and Stegner (1979) showed that people judgments are important.
Alternatively, novices may not see themselves as cacombining information from different external sources take the perceived expertise of those sources into ac-pable of making particularly good judgments. However, they normally rely primarily on their own opinions count: if people presented with advice regard themselves as well as their advisors as sources of informa-rather than on those of their advisors because what they find cognitively demanding is not so much making tion, the way they combine external information (advice) with internal information (their own judgment) the judgments in the first place as integrating them with the views of their advisors. Only when judgments should be influenced by the levels of expertise that they perceive to be present both in themselves and in are particularly important do they decide to carry out the additional mental work needed to perform this intetheir advisors.
Second, work on attitude change has shown that the gration. This suggests that novices should place more reliance on advisors and be more influenced by advisors' effectiveness of a persuasive message depends on the expertise attributed to its source (e.g., Petty, Cacci-levels of expertise when judgments are important. opo, & Goldman, 1981) .
1 However, reliance on periph-
EXPERIMENT 1
eral cues such as this tends to give way to analysis of message content when recipients regard themselves as On the basis of these considerations, we designed a knowledgeable or experienced in dealing with the issue first experiment to answer two questions. Are novice to which the message refers (e.g., Wood, 1982; Wood, judges more influenced by advisors who have greater Kallgren, & Priesler, 1985) or when the issue is taken experience at the task? How is the extent to which they to be a relatively important one (e.g., Chaiken & are influenced by advice affected by the importance of Maheswaran, 1994) . People are more likely to carry out the judgment that they have to make? mental work when they perceive it to be easy (because they are practised at it) or when they need to be accurate The Task (because the outcome is important) (cf. Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993) .
We employed a cue-learning task. This approach enabled us to study advice-taking after participants had To what extent can these contingent processing notions be generalized beyond persuasion to advice-tak-acquired different amounts of experience at the task.
It appears that people use information about the ing? Given the work discussed earlier (e.g., Sniezek & Buckley, 1995) , it is reasonable to expect that novice amount of experience acquired in a task as a means of judging expertise in performing it. This is suggested by judges will be more likely than experienced judges to take advice and that they will be more influenced by the illusions of learning that occur when people expect practice to be effective but it is not (e.g., Adams & Goetz, the level of expertise attributed to their advisors. But what about the effect of the importance of the judgment? 1973; Harvey, 1994; Marteau, Johnston, Wynne, & Evans, 1989 given the algorithm but had to predict the criterion value that it would produce on the basis of the cue trials, and a third had 240 training trials. When they were told an advisor's recommendation, they were also values. To achieve a reasonably rapid learning rate, we used a simple task with just two cue values and no told how many training trials that particular advisor had received. As we mentioned above, we expected peoerror component (cf. Hammond & Summers, 1965; Summers & Hammond, 1968) . We also presented cues ple to perceive advisors who had received more training as having greater expertise in the task. pictorially rather than numerically. By providing clarity at the expense of precision (Cooksey, 1996; Stewart, In fact, all advice was generated by the experimenters, and it did not depend in any way on the number 1988), this can be expected to speed up learning but to limit its asymptotic level. Finally, we provided partici-of practice trials that were specified for the advisor.
Impressions of expertise were under our control. This pants with a cover story to frame their judgments. Scenarios do not always facilitate performance (Sanderson, was important for two reasons. First, it ensured that variability arising from individual differences in advi-1989). However, they tend to do so when they embed the task in a setting known to the participants (Berry & sors' learning rates did not contaminate our results.
Second, it allowed us to produce systematic variation Broadbent, 1984; Stanley, Mathews, Buss, & KotlerCope, 1989 ) and when they generate more accurate in the quality of the advice that was independent of the level of training attributed to the advisors. One third beliefs about the formal relationship holding between cue and criterion values (Adelman, 1981; Sanderson, of the recommendations provided by advisors with each level of training specified the correct criterion value; 1989).
During the training phase, participants were given one third underestimated that value by a given amount; the remaining third overestimated it by the same outcome feedback after each trial that specified the correct criterion value. With simple cue-learning tasks, amount. Thus any effect of the expertise attributed to the advisors cannot arise from differences in the actual outcome feedback is effective in producing learning (e.g. Schmitt, Coyle, & Saari, 1977) . However, we used a quality of advice they provide.
2
To manipulate the importance of judgments, we used multiplicative rather than an additive relationship between the two cues. While this makes tasks simpler a scenario in which participants made forecasts to provide farmers with immediate compensation from the (i.e., easier to learn) in some situations, it makes them more complex in others (Edgell, 1993) . We therefore government for loss of cattle from outbreaks of disease.
Specifically, they had to predict how many cattle would carried out pilot studies to check that reasonably rapid learning occurred in the task. These confirmed that it die on the basis of the size of the land area affected and the type of disease. Error in forecasts would lead to did so. After just 30 trials, performance was significantly improved but still below what could be achieved inappropriate compensation which would incur the wrath of either the farmers or the government when with more practice. We shall characterize people after this level of training as novices. After 100 trials, perfor-the outbreak had finished and the true number of deaths had been ascertained. mance started to asymptote: we shall characterize people at this stage of learning as semi-experienced. Finally, We expected participants to regard more severe outbreaks as more important because they provided the after 240 trials, the performance asymptote was clearly evident: we shall characterize people who have had this potential for more costly forecast errors. In an attempt to reinforce the salience of this link, participants were amount of practice as experienced. The current experiment investigated advice-taking in novices. In later ex-given points for their performance during their training. A correct judgment warranted 100 points. An incorperiments, we studied it in semi-experienced and experienced judges.
rect one received points equal to 100 divided by the absolute difference between judgment and criterion. The training phase was followed by a test session in which no feedback about the correct criterion value was Hence the number of points they received after a given percentage error in their judgment was inversely regiven. On each test trial, participants first gave their initial estimate of the criterion value. Next, they re-lated to the severity of the outbreak. For example, when the criterion was 20, a 10% judgment error still resulted ceived a recommendation from the advisor. After that, they produced a final estimate based both on the cue values of the stimulus in front of them and on the advice in an award of 50 points but, when the criterion was judgment when shown the stimulus and then received feedback information. 50, it produced only 20 points.
After training, participants completed 72 test trials.
Method
On each one, they first made their initial estimate of the criterion value in the same way as they had done Participants. Thirty undergraduate students from during training. However, once they had done this, the the psychology department at University College Londisplay changed. In the upper half of the screen, they don acted as participants. The experiment took each of saw two boxes: the left one repeated the initial estimate them about 60 min to complete. they had given, and the right one specified the number Stimuli. Stimuli were computer-controlled and pre-of training trials they had received. In the lower half sented on a color monitor. They comprised colored cir-of the screen were two more boxes for corresponding cles presented for approximately half a second in a gray details of the advisor's estimate and training level. frame. The frame measured 18 cm by 11.5 cm. The size These boxes flashed for a short but variable period: and color of the circles were cues for the participants' participants were told that the computer was searching responses, and so they varied from trial to trial. Position for the information relevant to the particular outbreak of the circles within the frame was also varied from under consideration. After details of the advisor's estitrial to trial to ensure that the distance between the mate and training level had been displayed, particiedge of the circle and the frame could not act as a pants typed in their final estimate. substitute for the size cue.
Correct advice (viz. advice giving participants the A request for participants to make an estimate of correct answer) was just the criterion value (Y) that the criterion value appropriate to the size and color of the algorithm produced from the cue values (r, ␤) sethe displayed circle appeared below the frame. Partici-lected on that trial. To produce incorrect advice (viz. pants could see their response as they typed it in. Dur-advice giving participants the incorrect answer), one ing training, feedback information specifying the cor-standard deviation (17 pixels) was added to or subrect criterion value and the number of points for their tracted from the value for the radius (r) that had been judgment of it appeared above the frame for 3 s after selected on that trial. This new r value was then inthe response had been entered. serted into the algorithm to obtain a criterion value Criterion values (Y) were related to the area (X) and greater or less than the correct one. color of the displayed circle by the following algorithm:
The training level of the advisor was given as 30 trials, 100 trials or 240 trials. Each of these three levels Y ϭ ␣␤X, of advisors' training was specified on a third of the 72 test trials. Within each level, a third of the advice was where correct, a third was greater than the correct value, and a third was less than it. Thus there were eight test X ϭ r 2 trials for each of the nine combinations of advisors' training level and advice quality. Outbreak severity was Here ␣ was a constant (0.001), r was the radius of the varied over these eight trials by using different combicircle, and ␤ took on a value of one half when the circle nations of circle radius and color for each one. There was blue, one when it was purple, two when it was was one high area outbreak (r Ͼ 70 pixels) and one green, and three when it was red. low area outbreak (r Ͻ 70 pixels) for each of the four Within our scenario, color represented the type of diseases. This gave the following criterion numbers of virus causing disease, X was the area affected by it, cattle deaths (with their associated cue values in parenand Y was the number of cattle dying from it. ture makes an inspection to determine how serious the situation is. This is because they have to make a foreVarious measures of overall forecast accuracy have cast of how many cattle will die. These forecasts are been proposed (Makridakis, Wheelwright, & McGee, needed because initial compensation is paid on the basis 1983; Wheelwright & Makridakis, 1985) . Some are releof them. This ensures that farmers have some immedi-vant only to time-series forecasting, but three can be ate recompense rather than having to wait until the considered as candidates for measuring forecasting acoutbreak has finished before making a claim. curacy in our task. The first of these is the root mean Forecasts need to be accurate so that farmers receive squared error (RMSE). This is calculated by taking the neither too little compensation (unfair to them) or too square root of the average of the squared differences much (unfair to the taxpayer). Consequently, the Minis-between forecasts and criterion values. The second is try of Agriculture trains their inspectors to provide the mean absolute percentage error (MAPE). This is them with some skill in forecasting the severity of dis-the mean of the absolute values of the percentage errors ease outbreaks. Historical data are used so that train-in the forecasts. (Percentage error is the difference beees can be told the actual number of cattle deaths in tween the forecast and criterion expressed as a percentan outbreak after they have made each forecast. To age of the criterion.) The third is the median absolute motivate their learning, they are rewarded with points. percentage error (MdAPE). This is the median of the These are on a sliding scale: the greater the difference absolute values of the percentage errors in the forebetween the forecast and the actual number of cattle casts. deaths, the lower the number of points. Carbone and Armstrong's (1982) survey of 145 foreAfter the scenario had been set, participants were casting experts showed that up to the early 1980s given the following specific instructions.
RMSE was the preferred accuracy measure among
In the training session, you will see brief presentations of colthem. It has a number of advantages, not least of which oured circles. The size of a circle reflects the amount of land that is that it (or derivatives of it) can be partitioned into is infected. forecast and thereby improve your future forecasts. After 30 assessments, your ability to make these judgments should have
As the need for unit-free measures became recognized improved considerably.
(e.g., Chatfield, 1988) , forecasting experts came to prefer MAPE over RMSE (Ahlburg, 1992; In the second part of the experiment, you will use your training to make forecasts of how many cattle will die in current outbreaks.
Collopy, 1992). However, two problems associated with
Obviously you can receive no information about the accuracy of use of MAPE need to be borne in mind (Armstrong & these assessments because cattle are still dying. However, after Collopy, 1992; Fildes, 1992) . First, it is appropriate only making your assessment, you will be told the views of someone for ratio-scaled data (i.e., data with a meaningful zero).
who has also inspected the same outbreak. You will also be told how much training this person received from the Ministry. After
Second, it is bounded on the low side but it is unbounded getting this information you will be given the opportunity of on the high side. This bias in favor of low forecasts revising your original forecast. Do not feel obliged to make use of needs to be taken into account when MAPE scores are this information. It is up to you whether you take it into account.
analyzed by applying an appropriate transformation to After reading these instructions, participants com-them (Box & Cox, 1964) . pleted the experiment. When they had finished, they
In selecting an error measure, it is important to take were thanked for their participation and debriefed. reliability and validity into consideration. Armstrong There was no indication that they had been aware that and Collopy (1992) assessed reliability by studying the their advisors had been notional rather than actual or extent to which an error measure produced the same that they had realized that the quality of the advice accuracy rankings for 11 forecasting methods when it received from these advisors had been independent of was applied to five different subsamples of 19 data sets. the level of expertise attributed to them.
For each error measure, they calculated Spearman rank-order correlation coefficients for the accuracy Measures of forecast accuracy and advice-taking. -rankings between each pair of subsamples and then Selecting measures of forecast accuracy and advice-takaveraged the resulting 10 pairwise correlations to obing is not a simple matter. All indices have advantages tain an overall estimate of reliability. Estimates for and disadvantages, and the value of each of them relative to others varies from situation to situation.
RMSE, MdAPE, and MAPE turned out to be 0.2, 0.4, and 0.5, respectively. Furthermore, MAPE had the one participant gave 60 as an initial estimate, received advice that it should be 55 and then typed 5959 instead, highest construct validity (r s ϭ 0.9).
To maximize reliability and validity, we followed the presumably, of 59. This procedure resulted in less than one per cent of the data being excluded. practice currently preferred by forecasters and adopted MAPE as our accuracy measure. Our data have a meanIn this section, we shall briefly comment of the effectiveness of training and then present analyses of the ingful zero (i.e., no dead cattle), and so, in this respect, it is an appropriate index. However, deciding to use level of advice-taking and of the effect of advice on judgment quality. MAPE does not constitute an unconditional endorsement of this measure: as we mentioned above, it is Figure 1a shows that MAPE scores decreased over the three blocks of the training session. Slope of the important to bear in mind the problems associated with it when carrying out analyses. In particular, data trans-graph of the log of their standard deviations against the log of their means was 0.08, indicating that data formation may be appropriate (Box & Cox, 1964) .
Our advice-taking paradigm is one of a number con-transformation was unnecessary (Box & Cox, 1964) .
Comparison of the first and last blocks indicated that cerned with the influence that an external estimate or expression of the criterion value has on quantitative learning occurred (t(29) ϭ 2.75; p Ͻ .01). However, as we shall see when comparing these results with those of judgment. Percentage shift is usually taken as a measure of this influence. For example, in their study of later experiments, it did not reach its asymptotic level. Figure 1b shows the mean values of percentage shifts the hindsight bias, Hell, Gigerenzer, Gauggel, Mall, and Mü ller (1988) first required people to judge various in judgment as a function of the level of training attributed to the advisors and the outbreak severity. Inspecquantities, later presented them with the correct values and asked them to use their memory to decide whether tion of these data suggests that shifts increased with the level of training attributed to advisors but were each of their responses had differed from the correct one by more than a factor of two, and finally told them unaffected by outbreak severity. To confirm this impression and to check whether people were sensitive to adto reproduce their original responses. To measure the effect that processing the correct values had on memory vice quality, we carried out an analysis of variance using advisors' training level, outbreak severity, and advice for responses, they used the percentage shift measure: the difference between the original and final response correctness as within-subject variables. Effect of advisors' training level was highly significant (F(2,2050) ϭ was expressed as a percentage of the difference between the original and correct response.
23.90; p Ͻ .0001) but neither of the other main effects nor any of the interactions approached significance. We adopted this same percentage shift measure: the influence of advice was estimated as the difference be-There was no evidence that people were sensitive either to outbreak severity or to advice correctness. tween the original and final judgment expressed as a percentage of the difference between the original judg- Figure 1c shows the reduction in MAPE between judges' initial and final judgment as a function of the ment and the advice. Thus someone whose original judgment is 90, who receives advice of 100, and who training attributed to the advisors and the correctness of advice they gave. To study the effect of advice, we then moves to 95 shows a 50% shift. If they had perversely moved to 85 after the same advice, they would carried out an analysis of variance on the MAPE scores using advisors' training level, outbreak severity, advice have shown a shift of Ϫ50%; if they had moved to 105, they would have shown a shift of 150%. In other words, correctness, and occasion (pre-vs post-advice) as within-subject variables. However, as the graph of the the measure is unbounded on both its high and low sides. (In fact, in our study virtually all shifts were log of the cell standard deviations against the log of their means had a slope of .44, we first subjected them between 0 and 100%.)
Of course, as with all percentage measures, it is im-to a square root transformation (Box & Cox, 1964) . The effect of occasion was highly significant portant to recognize that shifts that differ in absolute terms may be characterized as equivalent. For example, (F(1,4184) ϭ 44.95; p Ͻ .0001), demonstrating that advice improved judgments. Initial judgments were so bad someone who moves from 90 to 95 after advice of 100 shifts the same 50% as someone else who moves from that even the incorrect advice that we gave produced final judgments that were an improvement on them 60 to 80 after advice of 100. (Fig. 1c) . However, greater improvements were proResults duced by correct advice, an unsurprising phenomenon that led to a significant main effect of advice correctness Trials in which participants gave criterion values that were more than five times the correct value were (F(1,4184) ϭ 30.84; p Ͻ .0001) and a significant interaction between occasion and advice correctness (F(1,4184) excluded from the analysis. This filter served to eliminate responses that were clear mistypings: for example, ϭ 40.41; p Ͻ .0001). An interaction between occasion and advisors' train-Discussion ing level (F(2,4184) ϭ 3.24; p Ͻ .05) showed that improvements were greater when advisors were attribOur novice judges took more advice from advisors whom they regarded as more highly trained. Thus one uted with more expertise. Again, this is not surprising: judges took more advice from more experienced advi-of the generalizations derived from work on the effectiveness of persuasive messages (e.g., Petty & Cacciopo, sors (Fig. 1b) , and, therefore, its beneficial effect was greater. One might expect that taking more advice 1986) applies equally to advice-taking: non-experts are influenced by information that they interpret as diagwould magnify the difference between the benefits of taking good advice and poor advice. Figure 1c suggests nostic of the credibility or expertise of the source of a message. In Sniezek and Buckley's (1995) experiment, this is so. However, the three-way interaction between occasion, advice correctness, and advisors' training this information specified level of confidence; in our experiment, it specified level of training. level did not quite reach a conventional level of significance (F(2,4184) ϭ 2.77; p ϭ .06); only the two-way Our predictions about effects of outbreak severity fared less well. We assumed that people would treat interaction between the latter two variables did so (F(2,4184) ϭ 4.30; p Ͻ .05).
judgments about more severe outbreaks as more important because the consequences of forecast error were For the six most severe outbreaks, pre-advice and post-advice MAPE scores were unaffected by outbreak greater. On the face of it, this does not seem unreasonable: a 35% forecast error for an outbreak killing 14 size: they averaged 35 and 28%, respectively. However, for the two least severe outbreaks, MAPE scores were cattle corresponds to a mean over-or underestimation of five cattle, whereas the same error for an outbreak much higher, were reduced more by advice, and were affected more by advice correctness. These differences killing 104 cattle corresponds to a mean over-or underestimation of 36 cattle. The average error in compensaproduced a main effect of severity (F(7,4184) ϭ 98.88; p Ͻ .0001) and interactions between this factor and tion would be more than seven times greater in the latter case. occasion (F(7,4184) ϭ 3.66; p Ͻ .001) and between it and advice correctness (F(7,4184) ϭ 3.38; p Ͻ .01).
We considered two possibilities. First, novices may be able to improve their own judgments by putting more These effects appear to be artifacts of the small absolute size of the criterion values in the two least severe out-cognitive effort into them. If they could, they would be more likely to do so when they perceive their task as breaks and of the experimental requirement to produce judgments as whole numbers. For example, initially important (e.g., Payne et al., 1993) . Hence, they should place less reliance on advice when outbreaks are severe. judging that the least severe outbreak will kill six cattle and revising this to five after advice gives pre-and Alternatively, people may be disinclined to make careful and discriminating use of advice because they find dopost-advice MAPE scores of 50 and 25%, respectively; changing the judgments by a single unit produces a ing so cognitively demanding. If this is so and if they see advice as potentially beneficial, they would be more much larger MAPE reduction than the 7% average observed for the six most severe outbreaks.
likely to make use of it when they perceive their task as important (Payne et al., 1993) . Hence, they should are low enough for them to accept responsibility for them themselves. place more reliance on advice when outbreaks are severe.
It remains true, however, that people would have to possess some initial level of forecasting competence for As we have seen, neither of these patterns was present in the data. This may have been because outbreak any effect of task importance to appear. If they could not even judge outbreak severity within some broad severity was insufficiently salient as an indicator of task importance. We hoped that the scenario itself range, they could not use the location of that range as a basis for their decision about whether to take advice. would be enough to establish this relationship but, to reinforce it, we gave participants points for their perfor-It is quite possible that we failed to obtain an effect of task importance because the 30 training trials that we mance during training. Lack of an effect of outbreak severity may indicate that the point system was ineffec-gave our participants were insufficient to enable them to estimate a range of outbreak severities that was tive. Participants may have lacked the motivation to use it: it did not act as a basis for monetary payment. narrow enough to define their judgment as relatively important or unimportant. Perhaps, if our judges had Alternatively, they may have found it difficult to interpret: points received after a given percentage error were been semi-experienced rather than novices, task importance would have affected advice-taking. With this posinversely related to outbreak severity, and people find inverse relationships such as this difficult to learn (e.g. sibility in mind, we performed another experiment. This time, participants received 100 training trials: Brehmer, 1973; Brehmer, Kuylenstierna, & Liljergren, 1974) . In fact, during the informal debriefing after the from their point of view, their training was equivalent to that of their semi-experienced advisors. experiment, participants occasionally admitted that they paid little attention to the points that they were EXPERIMENT 2
given. However, they still claimed that they recognized that more severe outbreaks would be more important People were given 100 training trials. In all other within our scenario. respects, the experiment was identical to Experiment Another possibility needs to be considered. Both of 1. Research on the effectiveness of persuasive messages our alternative hypotheses were based on the notion suggests that the more highly trained judges in this that people initially assess the importance of their task experiment will take less advice than the novices in the and then make a further decision about how to proceed first experiment, and that the amount they do take will on the basis of the results of this assessment. Assessing be less influenced by the level of training attributed task importance requires judging outbreak severity.
to their advisors (e.g., Petty et al., 1981) . Given the But if people can assess outbreak severity, they do not arguments outlined in the previous section, we were need to make a further decision about how to proceed also interested to discover whether outbreak severity because assessing outbreak severity is all that their would have an effect on the degree to which judges in task requires: outbreak severity is given by number of this experiment took advice. cattle deaths, and number of cattle deaths is the criterion that they are required to estimate. This line of Method reasoning suggests that lack of an effect of task importance on advice-taking should not be regarded as surParticipants. Thirty people from the same populaprising: people who know they can assess outbreak se-tion as before acted as participants. None of them had verity can recognize they do not need advice; those who taken part in the first experiment. The experiment took know they cannot assess it can recognize that they need each of them about 75 min to complete. advice but cannot tailor the amount of advice they take Stimuli, design, and procedure. Participants were to task importance.
given 100 training trials, and the instructions that they In fact, the circularity of the argument here is only received reflected this. In all other respects, the experiapparent. It disappears once it is recognized that ability mental method was identical to that used in the first exto assess outbreak severity need not be all-or-none: it periment. can be partial. Consider, for example, people who are only able to forecast outbreak severity as falling within Results a broad range. If that range is centered in the higher part of the severity continuum, such people may feel Data were subjected to the same filter as before to eliminate responses that were clearly the result of that the judgment is important enough to take advice in order to obtain greater precision. On the other hand, mistypings. Again, this resulted in fewer than 1% of the data being excluded from training and test sessions. if the range is centered in the lower part of severity continuum, they may feel that the consequences of error Figure 2a shows that MAPE scores decreased over the 10 blocks of the training session. Slope of the graph of advice they gave. We performed an analysis of variance on these scores using advisors' training level, outof the log of their standard deviations against the log of their means was 0.02, indicating that data transfor-break severity, advice correctness, and occasion (prevs post-advice) as within-subject variables. However, mation was unnecessary. Both linear (t(1) ϭ 4.98; p Ͻ .001) and quadratic (t(1) ϭ 3.47; p Ͻ .01) coefficients as the graph of the log of the cell standard deviations against the log of their means had a slope of .89, we of the regression of MAPE scores on to trial blocks were significant, and the overall fit of this model was good first subjected them to a logarithmic transformation (Box & Cox, 1964) . (F(2,9) ϭ 31.47; p Ͻ .001; adj. R 2 ϭ .87). Thus learning took place and showed evidence of approaching its as-
The pattern of results produced by this analysis was quite similar to that in the first experiment. The effect ymptotic level. Performance on the third block in this experiment was not significantly different from perfor-of occasion was highly significant (F(1,4210) ϭ 10.47; p Ͻ .01), showing that advice improved judgments. Even mance on the third block in the previous one. However, performance on the last block of this experiment was poor advice produced some improvement. However, the greater improvement produced by correct advice led to significantly better than performance on the last block of the previous one (t(52) ϭ 3.23; p Ͻ .01). Thus the a main effect of advice correctness (F(1,4210) ϭ 5.58; p Ͻ .05) and an interaction between this variable and additional training was effective in producing additional learning.
occasion (F(1,4210) ϭ 19.82; p Ͻ .0001). Given that people took more advice from more highly trained adviFor each trial in the test session, percentage shift between pre-advice and post-advice judgments was cal-sors and that advice benefited their judgments, one would expect the reduction in MAPE to be greater when culated as before. Figure 2b shows the mean values of these shifts as a function of level of training attributed advice was taken from more experienced advisors. MAPE scores were higher and affected more by advice training attributed to advisors, and that there may be some effect of outbreak severity. An analysis of variance correctness and by the different amounts of advice taken from different types of advisor for the two least using advisors' training level, outbreak severity, and advice correctness as within-subject variables con-severe outbreaks than for the other six outbreaks.
These differences produced a main effect of severity firmed the first of these impressions but not the second one. Effect of advisors' training level was highly signifi-(F(7,4210) ϭ 53.70; p Ͻ .0001) and interactions between this factor and advisors' training level (F(14,4210) ϭ cant (F(2,2062) ϭ 10.90; p Ͻ .0001) but neither of the other main effects nor any of the interactions reached 2.42, p Ͻ .01), between it and advice correctness (F(7,4210) ϭ 2.19; p Ͻ .05), and between all three of significance. Figure 2c shows reduction in MAPE scores between these variables (F(14,4210) ϭ 2.56; p Ͻ .01). Again, these effects can be interpreted as artifacts of the small pre-advice and post-advice judgments as a function of the training attributed to the advisors and the quality absolute size of the criterion values in the two least severe outbreaks and of the experimental requirement experimental method was identical to that in the first two experiments. to produce judgments as whole numbers.
Discussion Results
Superficially, the results of this experiment appear Data were subjected to the same filter as before to very similar to those of the first one. The mean shift in exclude responses that were clearly the result of judgment after advice was lower (23%) than before mistypings. Again, this resulted in no more than 1% of (30%) but level of advisor training was still the only the data being dropped from the training and test sesvariable that significantly affected the size of this shift. sions. However, whereas the size of the shift was identical for Figure 3a shows that MAPE scores decreased over the least severe and most severe outbreaks in the first the 24 blocks of the training session. Slope of the graph experiment (31%), it was 7% higher for the most severe of the log of their standard deviations against the log outbreak in the present experiment. We suspect that of their means was 0.08, indicating that data transforthere was a real but small effect of severity but that mation was unnecessary. Both linear (t(1) ϭ 6.41; p Ͻ our experimental design lacked the statistical power .001) and quadratic (t(1) ϭ 5.08; p Ͻ .001) coefficients required to reveal it as significant. Rather than repeat of the regression of MAPE scores on to trial blocks were the experiment with a larger group of participants, we significant, and the overall fit of this model was good decided to modify it in a way that we thought would (F(2,23) ϭ 31.84; p Ͻ .001; adj. R 2 ϭ .73). Thus learning increase the size of the effect to be obtained.
took place and showed evidence of becoming asymptotic. Performance on the third block in this experiment
EXPERIMENT 3
was not significantly different from performance on that block in either of the previous experiments. NeiPerhaps most people need more than 100 training ther was performance on the tenth block of this experitrials to estimate a range of outbreak severities narrow ment significantly different from performance on that enough to define the importance of their task and hence block in the second experiment. Finally, performance to act as a basis for deciding how much advice to take. on the last block of the present experiment was signifiWith this possibility in mind, we designed a third exper-cantly better than performance on the last block of the iment. The amount of training we gave judges was more first experiment (t(51) ϭ 2.08; p Ͻ .05) but not of the than doubled to 240 trials to ensure that any embryonic second experiment. Thus increasing the level of traineffect of outbreak severity in the second experiment ing from 10 to 24 blocks of trials failed to produce a would emerge fully fledged as a significant one in this further reduction in forecast error. experiment. This means that, from their point of view, As before, percentage shift between pre-advice and they had received the same amount of training as their post-advice judgments was calculated for each trial of experienced advisors and considerably more than either the test session. Figure 3b shows mean values of these their semi-experienced or their novice advisors. shifts as a function of level of training attributed to Based on work on the effectiveness of persuasive mes-advisors and outbreak severity. Analysis of variance sages (e.g., Petty et al., 1981) , we also expected this using advisors' training level, outbreak severity and additional training to reduce the shift in judgment advice correctness as within-subject variables revealed caused by the advice and to lessen the influence that that only the effect of outbreak severity reached signifithe level of training attributed to advisors has on the cance (F(7,2060) ϭ 2.52; p Ͻ .05). Whereas mean shifts size of this shift.
for the six least severe outbreaks were fairly constant (range 17-19%) , that for the most severe outbreak was Method much larger (35%). Neither of the other main effects nor any of the interactions approached significance. Participants. Thirty more people from the same Figure 3c shows reduction in MAPE scores between population as before acted as participants. None of them pre-advice and post-advice judgments as a function of had participated in either of the earlier experiments.
the training attributed to the advisors and the quality They each required about 90 min to complete the trainof the advice they gave. We performed an analysis of ing and test sessions.
variance on these scores using advisors' training level, outbreak severity, advice correctness, and occasion (preStimuli, design, and procedure. Participants received 240 training trials, and the instructions that vs post-advice) as within-subject variables. However, as the graph of the log of the cell standard deviations they were given reflected this. In all other respects, the against the log of their means had a slope of .80, we training, shift their judgments about 20% when presented with advice from someone who has had little first applied a logarithmic transformation to them (Box & Cox, 1964) .
training. Highly trained judges still shift their judgments by this amount when the advice comes from The effect of occasion was significant (F(1,4188) ϭ 5.42; p Ͻ .05), showing that advice improved judgments. someone who is moderately or highly trained. However, judges who are less well trained shift their judgments As in previous experiments, an interaction of this variable with advice correctness showed that correct advice more when their advisors are better trained than they are. This increase is greater when the difference bewas more beneficial (F(1,4188) ϭ 5.22; p Ͻ .05).
There was a significant main effect of severity tween judges' and advisors' training levels is higher. The analysis also produced a significant effect of out-(F(7,4188) ϭ 65.76; p Ͻ .0001). As before, this effect arose because MAPE scores for the two least severe break severity (F(7,609) ϭ 2.57; p Ͻ .05). Figure 4b shows a shift in judgment after advice as a function of outbreaks were higher. It can again be interpreted as an artifact of the small absolute size of criterion values judge's training and outbreak severity. Although the interaction between these two variables failed to reach in the two least severe outbreaks and of the experimental requirement to give judgments as whole numbers. significance, we have seen from our individual analyses of the three experiments that the change in shift as Cross-experimental comparison of shifts in judgment outbreaks become more severe was negligible when after advice. Inspection of Figs. 1b, 2b, and 3b sug-judges were poorly trained, positive but nonsignificant gests that more highly trained judges were less influ-when they were moderately trained, and significant enced by advice. This is something to be expected on when they were highly trained. the basis of research that has been done on the effectiveness of persuasive messages. To discover whether the Discussion effect is a significant one, we carried out an analysis of variance with judge's level of training as a between-
In this third experiment, we increased the level of training that judges received to the level attributed to subjects variable and advisor's level of training and outbreak severity as within-subjects variables.
their most experienced advisors. Although this did not improve their performance, it is likely to have increased The analysis showed that judge's level of training did indeed affect the extent to which judgments were their confidence (Harvey, 1994) . This, in turn, would have influenced their advice-taking (Arkes et al., 1987 ; influenced by advice (F(2,87) ϭ 3.92; p Ͻ .05). However, as expected on the basis of the individual analyses of the Trafimow & Sniezek, 1994) . More specifically, work on persuasion (Wood, 1982; Wood et al., 1985) suggests three experiments, a significant main effect of advisor training (F(2,174) ϭ 23.56; p Ͻ .0001) and a significant that they would become less influenced by information about the credibility of the source of their advice. This interaction between judge's training and advisor's training (F(4,174) ϭ 5.35; p Ͻ .001) were also obtained. is exactly what we found: the effect of level of training attributed to advisors was eliminated. As Fig. 4a shows, all judges, whatever their level of 
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Although the extra experience that people received in this experiment did not significantly reduce their overall forecast error, it did enable them to appreciate
The three experiments produced a fairly complex patand be influenced by the different degrees of task impor-tern of results. However, we shall suggest here that the tance.
4 But why were they influenced by task impor-amount of advice people take can be explained fairly tance? Earlier, we considered two possibilities. First, simply in terms of three separate components. First, it people may be able to improve their own judgments by appears that there is a basic level of advice-taking that putting more effort into them. If they could, they would is present whatever the other features of the task. Secbe more likely to do so when they perceived the task ond, when judges believe advisors have greater experas important (Payne et al., 1993) . This would have re-tise than they do themselves, they add a component to sulted in less advice-taking when outbreaks were se-this basic level. The size of the component they add is vere. This is opposite to the pattern of results that we related to the extent to which the advisor appears to have obtained here.
have greater expertise. The final component is involved The second possibility was that people recognize ad-only when judges acquire sufficient experience to distinvice as potentially beneficial but find integrating it with guish important judgments from relatively unimporttheir own judgments cognitively demanding. Hence ant ones. they would be more likely to make the effort to use the In the following sections, we discuss each of these advice when the task is more important and when the three components in turn. We tentatively identify them advice comes from a more credible source. We did indeed with accepting help, improving judgment, and sharing find that advice-taking was greater when the task was responsibility for high-risk judgments. more important. However, as we have seen, there was no evidence that it was greater when its source was Accepting Help more credible.
If people were taking advice for no other reason than Figure 4a shows that people shifted their judgments about 20% towards advice that they believed had come to improve their judgments, they should have weighted advice from experienced sources more heavily. That this from someone who had received no more training than they had themselves. Even experienced judges (240 pattern did not emerge here suggests that the need to improve judgment was not the only reason that people training trials) shifted their judgments by this amount in response to advice from novices (30 training trials) took advice. In what follows, we propose that another quite different factor was responsible for the effect of who, they were told, had received eight times less training than they had themselves. Why did these experitask importance obtained in this third experiment.
enced participants take any account of the novices' possible advantages of combination for the better fore-presumably, valueless as advice. Despite this, judges accepted their advice on 47 (87%) of the 54 occasions. caster are still less when the other forecaster is worse. But, as we have seen, experienced judges took as much The 20% shift that we observed when advisors were no better trained than judges is not so striking as this, but account of advice from novices as they did of that from people as highly trained as themselves.
then our judges were not in direct social contact with their advisors. A second possibility is that experienced judges (but not novices or semi-experienced ones) came to view the The amount of advice-taking that is related to concerns about the social unacceptability of complete rejecimprovement due to training as having reached asymptote by the time that 30 training trials had been given. tion of advice may depend on contextual factors. It was constant at about 20% within our experimental paraThis could explain why they shifted their judgments in response to advice, but did so by the same amount digm. In other situations, such as where there is direct social contact between judges and advisors, it may well whatever the training level of their advisors. However, according to this view, they should have taken the aver-be higher. Conversely, when collecting advice incurs a monetary cost, it is likely to be lower (cf. Connolly & age of their initial judgment and the advice, thus producing a shift of 50% rather than 20%. Wholey, 1988) . Finally, we would also expect it to vary considerably from individual to individual in a manner A third possibility is that experienced judges (but not others) were able to recognize that the advice they were that may depend on personality factors. Unfortunately, whereas there is a large body of work on factors that told came from advisors with different degrees of training was, in fact, of the same quality. However, analysis determine how much help people offer (e.g., Latané & Nida, 1981) , there is a paucity of research on factors of the third experiment failed to show that experienced judges were any more capable of distinguishing correct that determine how much help people accept. advice from incorrect advice than the less well trained judges in the first two experiments. If they were not Improving Judgment sensitive to advice correctness, it is difficult to see how they could recognize what other judges could not (viz. Figure 4a shows that people who believed that their advisor had been provided with more training than they advice was no better when it came from advisors attributed with higher levels of training).
had received themselves shifted their judgments towards the advice by more than the basic 20% that we A final possibility is that the very act of offering someone advice puts that person under social pressure to have associated with an unwillingness to reject help. Furthermore, they related the size of this additional comply with it. Advice is usually given in the spirit of helping someone to do something or of helping them advice-taking to the apparent advantage in judgment skill that their advisor had over them. This broad patlearn to do it. People may be reluctant to ignore advice because they are concerned that this will be taken as tern of results is what would be expected on the basis of Hogarth and Einhorn's (1992) Belief Adjustment a rejection of help freely offered.
5 Even if they believe the advice to be without value, they may shift their model. It is also consistent with previous work on information combination (e.g., Birnbaum et al., 1976) and judgment a token amount toward it. The 20% shift that we observed judges to make when they believed their persuasion (e.g. Petty & Cacciopo, 1986) .
These features of the results can be interpreted in advisors to have received no more training than they had themselves may represent this token amount.
terms of participants' efforts to improve the quality of their judgments. Not unreasonably, they assume that Sniezek and Buckley's (1995) experiment convincingly demonstrates the importance of this type of social advisors who are more highly trained than they are themselves will provide them with real help and that compliance for advice-taking. Their judges answered two-choice questions after being provided with advice this help will be greater when their advisors have much more training than when they have only a modest from two other people. Both judges and advisors provided estimates of the probabilities that their choices amount more.
There is, however, one feature of the results that were correct by choosing numbers on a scale that ranged from .50 to 1.00. On 54 occasions, the two advisors initially appears anomalous if people were using bettertrained advisors to provide them with real help in imselected the same answer to the question but, via .50 confidence estimates, signaled to the judge that they proving the quality of their judgments. Even when they believed their advisors had been given eight times more both regarded their choice as a pure guess and hence, training than they had received themselves, the mean shift in their judgment towards the advice was still only 5 More generally, people may be reluctant to reject help that is not 40%. They did not even take a simple average of their needed because this may reduce the chances of it being offered in the future when it is needed.
own judgment and the advice: despite the difference in training, they weighted the former more heavily. Why advice but may still have reckoned that their own judgments would be better than those of advisors who had was this? received more training than they had. One possibility is that people used their own initial Confirmation of judges' overconfidence in their own judgment as an anchor and that they adjusted away judgments relative to those of advisors is reported by from it insufficiently when presented with advice. Such Gardner and Berry (1995) . People had to bring the outunder-adjustment is typically observed when people puts of a dynamical system into target ranges by alteremploy anchor-and-adjust heuristics in judgment tasks ing the value of control parameters. Advice was avail-(e.g. Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) . Although it is diffiable to them. The advice was always correct: "It was cult to discount this explanation, there are problems made clear to . . . experimental groups that no tricks with it. For example, we saw in the last section that were involved and that no wrong advice would be given" experienced judges take as much account of the views (p. 563). Furthermore, advice was free: taking it inof novices as they do of those of their peers: they appear curred no monetary penalty. Unsurprisingly, taking adto over-adjust rather than under-adjust when presented vice improved performance. Yet despite the fact that with advice from novices. Why did they not use the advice was beneficial to judgment, free and known to anchor-and-adjust heuristic or, if they did, why were be correct, people were reluctant to accept it fully. For social-compliance effects more than sufficient to counexample, in one experiment, advice was presented autoteract underadjustment in judgments that they made matically and specified whether each control parameter but not in judgments that novices made?
should be moved up, moved down or maintained at its Novices had no experience of being highly trained: current value: only 73% of participants acted in full they had no real basis for assessing the value of experiagreement with the advice. In another experiment, adenced judges' advice. They were free to doubt the value vice was presented only when people asked for it: they of any training additional to the little that they had requested it for only 44% of their judgments. received. In other words, they were provided with scope for being optimistic about the relative quality of their Sharing Responsibility judgments compared with those made by people with more experience. Perhaps this accounts for why they
The effect of judgment importance on advice-taking were not influenced more by advice from experienced is different from the effect of issue importance in perjudges.
suasion. First, it results in people being more rather Superficially, this explanation seems wanting. Even than less influenced by the views of others. Second, it if novices viewed any training over and above the 30 is determined not by the levels of expertise that they trials that they had received as worthless, they should perceive those other people to have but by the levels of still have valued judgments of experienced people as expertise that they perceive themselves to have. equal to theirs; in fact, as we have seen, they valued When judges were novices (Experiment 1), their adtheir own more. Furthermore, it is clear from the results vice-taking appears to have been determined only by of Experiment 1 (Fig. 1b) that novices did not consider their desire not to reject help and by their desire to the continuation of training beyond what they had re-improve the accuracy of their forecasts. As Fig. 4b ceived as worthless; they took more account of advice shows, the percentage shift in their judgment after adfrom people who were more highly trained.
vice was fairly constant at about 30% across all severity It is possible, however, that novices recognized the levels: this value is, of course, the average of the three value of training per se but used their scope for being points in the upper curve of Fig. 4a . optimistic to overestimate the value of training to them When judges were experienced (Experiment 3), their personally relative to its value for other people. This advice-taking for all but the most important judgment possibility is suggested by a number of studies. Svenson appears to have been determined solely by their desire (1981) and McKenna (1993) have shown that, on aver-not to reject all help. For all these judgments, adviceage, car drivers judge their skill levels as higher and taking was at the basic level attributed to that compotheir chances of being in an accident as lower than nent. However, for the most important judgment, it was those of the average driver. More recently, Koehler and about twice as high (Fig. 4b ). It appears that another Harvey (1997) found that actors were more overconfi-component, not related to the perceived expertise of the dent in their performance in a judgmental control task advisor, came into play for this judgment. than people who merely observed that same perforSemi-experienced judges (Experiment 2) were midmance. Clearly, then, participants in the present experi-way between novices and experienced judges. Like the ments may have recognized that providing advisors other two groups, their advice-taking was partly determined by their desire not to reject all help. Like novices, with more than 30 training trials would improve their it was also determined by their opportunity to improve This account of the importance effect is plausible but their judgments by taking more advice from advisors speculative. To test it, it would be useful to employ who had received more training than they had them-monetary pay-offs and to combine them with a means selves (Fig. 4a) . Finally, there was some suggestion of making the responsibility of advisors explicit. For that, like experienced judges, they took more advice for example, the importance of judgments could be defined the more important judgments (Fig. 4b) . However, this in terms of the size of the gains received when they are last effect differs from the corresponding one found for correct and the size of the losses suffered when they experienced judges in two ways. First, it was smaller are in error. Proportion of gains and losses assigned to and more variable: it did not reach significance. Second, advisors could then be specified as a proportion of the advice-taking appears to be relatively high not just for percentage shift in judgment that follows their advice. the most important judgment but for the two or three If people attempt to share responsibility for their judgmost important ones (Fig. 4b) . What were the reasons ments when risk reaches some threshold level, increasfor these differences?
ing this proportion should increase the minimum level People had to be able to assess importance before an of judgment importance for which their advice-taking importance-dependent effect could appear in the data. incorporates the responsibility-sharing factor. Judgment importance was determined by outbreak seFinally, it is worth pointing out that the notion that verity. As expertise in the task was defined by ability advice-taking allows people to share responsibility for to assess outbreak severity, it is not surprising that the important judgments and decisions chimes with the effect of importance evident when people were experi-views of those policy researchers who have argued that enced was only half-evident when they were semiexpe-governments use commissions of inquiry not only to rienced.
identify appropriate courses of action but also to legitiWhy would the minimum level of judgment impor-mize action or inaction (e.g., Bulmer, 1993) . tance for which advice-taking was elevated be lower for semiexperienced judges than for experienced ones? One possibility is that taking advice allows people to share Summary: Taking Advice responsibility for the consequences of error but that they decide to share responsibility only when the risk
We have argued that people considering how much associated with the judgment exceeds some threshold to be influenced by advice have three aims in mind: level.
they want to avoid completely rejecting help that is Risk is often characterized as expected loss (e.g., offered to them; they want to improve the quality of Yates & Stone, 1993) . In other words, it can be regarded their judgments; they want to share responsibility for as a product of the negative consequences arising from high-risk judgments. an undesirable outcome and the probability of that outPeople's reluctance to reject help is indicated by their come. In our experiments, the undesirable outcomes willingness to take some account of the views of people were errors in judgment. Consider one such outcome: whom they believe to be very much less expert at the an error of 20% in the forecast. People would perceive task than they are. Their insensitivity to differences in negative consequences of such an error to increase with the levels of training of these less well trained people outbreak severity and the probability of one to decrease suggests that they are not taking their views into acwith their experience at the task. Thus, if they need to count merely to reduce error variance in their judgshare responsibility for judgment when risk exceeds ments. some threshold level, the minimum level of outbreak People improve their judgments by taking advice severity for which they do try to share it should be lower from those who they perceive to be more expert than when they are less well trained (Fig. 4b) . they are themselves and by taking more advice from According to this account, people add a component those who they perceive to have greater expertise. Howto their advice-taking that represents a sharing of reever, their ability to use advice to improve judgments sponsibility for the judgment when the risk associated appears constrained by their overestimation of their with error is high. Their ability to add this component own judgment skill relative to that of people who have in the present task depended on their experience in the had as much or more training. task; the level of judgment importance at which they As people gain experience in the task, they become added it depended on their assessment of their own able to distinguish high-risk judgments from others. expertise. The lack of an interaction between the effects They share responsibility for these judgments by taking of importance and advisor training is not surprising about twice as much advice for them as they do for the because, for the purposes of sharing responsibility, anyone will do, regardless of their level of experience.
others. There is some suggestion that less well trained
